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The use of quantitative methods to analyze anticompetitive effects of mergers and acquisitions in antitrust: the Brazilian experience

Pires-Alves, Camila C.; Lyra, Marcos Puccioni de Oliveira; Bonfatti, Marina Maria Gutierrez;

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The paper aims to discuss the use of quantitative methods in quantifying merger effects as evidence, taking the particularities of the Brazilian experience and considering both technical, institutional and policy issues. Therefore, the paper investigates evolution and patterns in the Brazilian institutional framework and jurisprudence in terms of technical aspects and adequacy of implementation, policy issues regarding the acceptance within the administrative tribunal and the main challenges imposed. The information collected considered all the merger cases, as far as we know, in which quantitative methods were applied by CADE in order to measure, estimate or imply the merger’s potential anticompetitive effect on prices. Among the conclusions we find that the models are employed in few complex cases and mostly to sustain some restriction by the authority and the authority seems concerned about sensibility analysis, in some cases revealed by the combination of the use of different methods and/or competitive models.

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Palavras-chave: Competition Policy, merger effects, quantitative methods, CADE,


DOI: 10.5151/iv-enei-2019-6.4-077

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Como citar:

Pires-Alves, Camila C.; Lyra, Marcos Puccioni de Oliveira; Bonfatti, Marina Maria Gutierrez; "The use of quantitative methods to analyze anticompetitive effects of mergers and acquisitions in antitrust: the Brazilian experience", p. 1197-1215 . In: Anais do IV Encontro Nacional de Economia Industrial e Inovação. São Paulo: Blucher, 2019.
ISSN 2357-7592, DOI 10.5151/iv-enei-2019-6.4-077

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