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Política de defesa da concorrência em mercados intensivos em inovação: aspectos teóricos, normativos e análise dos casos envolvendo o mecanismo de busca da Google

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Este artigo discute a crescenteimportância das inovações para o processo competitivo e suas implicações sobre aanálise antitruste e a política de defesa da concorrência. Argumenta-se, apartir de uma perspectiva schumpeteriana, que as dificuldades encontradas pelaanálise antitruste tradicional para tratar de mercados intensivos em inovação decorre,em grande parte, do caráter estático da teoria que a fundamenta. Discutem-se,então, possíveis modificações dos fundamentos teóricos e das ferramentas daanálise antitruste, assim como dos procedimentos administrativos a serem utilizadospelas agências antitruste. Por fim, serão discutidos dois casos recentesenvolvendo o mecanismo de busca (searchengine) da Google, que demonstram não só a complexidade, mas também aurgência da adequação dos instrumentos de análise antitruste para lidar commercados intensivos em inovação.

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Palavras-chave: inovação, política de defesa da concorrência, antitruste, Google,

Palavras-chave: ,

DOI: 10.5151/enei2018-93

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, ; "Política de defesa da concorrência em mercados intensivos em inovação: aspectos teóricos, normativos e análise dos casos envolvendo o mecanismo de busca da Google", p. 1987-2009 . In: . São Paulo: Blucher, 2018.
ISSN 2357-7592, DOI 10.5151/enei2018-93

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